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Devotion and Attestation. 
Rational and ethical life in Patočka and Ricoeur  
 
Eddo Evink 
Open University, Heerlen, The Netherlands 





This article presents a comparison between Ricoeur’s and Patočka’s ideas on 
the subject as a rational and ethical person. Despite differences in style and 
interests, their work manifests important resemblances and agreements. The 
comparison focuses on the primordial embedding of the individual subject in 
natural and social structures, on the ethical implications of this situation of 
the subject, and on the differences in both philosophers’ evaluation of modern 
culture. 
 




In early modern philosophy the rational subject was a 
very successful figure. Rationality was man’s essence and pride. 
With precise objective argumentation and calculation all 
scientific problems could in principle be solved and man should 
be able to understand, dominate and perhaps even control the 
world he lived in. In addition, because of his (usually not her) 
rational capabilities, man was capable of coping with his 
emotions and making deliberate ethical decisions. In the age of 
Enlightenment, he could even play a main role in the historical 
development of victorious progress. But since Romanticism, 
from the nineteenth century on, his self-understanding 
radically changed. Schopenhauer, Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche and 
Freud undermined his position as rational master of the world 
and changed him in an irrational puppet that is guided by 
natural, social, cultural and psychical forces beyond his control. 
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In the twentieth century this fate is widely discussed in many 
currents of thought.  
Paul Ricoeur has played a prominent role in these 
discussions. He takes the critical approaches of the “masters of 
suspicion” seriously, but at the same time he looks for what can 
be saved from the modern human subject as a rational and 
ethical person. This project, the “hermeneutics of the subject” 
can even be seen as the core of his philosophical projects.  
In his writings on the thought of his colleague Jan 
Patočka, Ricoeur claims that Patočka takes the same position. 
The first of these texts was written for Le Monde, on March 19, 
1977, as an in memoriam after Patočka’s tragic death, caused 
by severe interrogations by the Czechoslovak secret police. 
Ricoeur situates Patočka’s dissidence in the line of the 
philosophical attestations of his teacher Edmund Husserl, who 
argued for a “…recovery [réveil] of the subject”, and against the 
resignations of reason by scientism, Romanticism and nihilism 
(Ricoeur 1991a, 69-70). Through Husserl, the intellectual 
resistance in Prague against the communist regime finds its 
roots, according to Ricoeur, in eighteenth century European 
rationalism:  
Without any doubt I can discern in this appeal of Husserl one of the 
links by which the current claim for liberties and human rights in 
Prague is connected to the great European rationalism of the classic 
age, through the 19th century socialisms. (Ricoeur 1991a, 70)1 
Ricoeur places this moral appeal for freedom and human 
rights in opposition to various forms of critique of reason that 
were widespread in Western Europe in the 1970s:  
For western intellectuals, who are very busy with getting loose of 
moralism and deconstructing rationalism, it is difficult to understand 
this recourse of Czech intellectuals to morality in the very field of 
political requests. (ibid.)2 
By referring to an open letter by Václav Havel, Ricoeur 
shows how the communist tyranny leads to “an incredible 
spiritual corruption”, to which a rational ethical attitude and an 
appeal to human rights are the only right answer. He ends his 
short article in honour of Patočka with the statement that “[…] 
in the case of extreme humiliation of a people, the philosophical 




plea for subjectivity becomes the only recourse of the civilian 
against the tyrant.” (ibid., 73)3 
Without any doubt we can praise Ricoeur for the way he 
honoured Patočka and for asking attention and support for 
Charta 77. But one might ask if Ricoeur was right in his sketch 
of Patočka’s philosophy as a rationalist defender of subjectivity. 
As Ricoeur knew very well (Ricoeur 2007), in critical studies of 
Husserl’s Cartesianism, Patočka had elaborated on an a-
subjective phenomenology (Patočka 1989a; 1989b; 1990a; 
1990b; 2000; 2015; Karfík 2008; Mensch 2016; Učnik 2015); and 
in his Heretical Essays as well as in other publications he had 
given a very critical analysis of modern Western thought and 
culture (Patočka 1996). Can he also be seen as a defender of the 
modern rational and ethical subject?  
In this article I shall make a comparison between 
Ricoeur’s and Patočka’s ideas on the subject as a rational and 
ethical person. This comparison will manifest important 
resemblances and agreements in their points of view, in spite of 
differences in style and interests. The comparison will focus on 
the primordial embedding of the individual subject in natural 
and social structures (a) and on the ethical implications of this 
situation of the subject (b). Further it will be shown that the 
main difference between their philosophies can be found in 
their evaluation of modern culture (c).  
 
1. Patočka 
Ricoeur and Patočka both belong, together with 
philosophers like Sartre, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, to the 
second generation of phenomenologists, who thoroughly studied 
Husserl, but were also deeply influenced by Heidegger. With 
Heidegger, all five made the move from a Husserlian 
phenomenology that mainly focused on epistemological matters 
to an existential phenomenology that saw human life as its 
central topic of research. But they also moved, each in their 
own way, beyond Heidegger, by emphasizing the bodily, social 
and cultural embedding of the subject, that was admittedly 
mentioned, but also neglected by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. 
They all regard the human person as originally embodied, 
social and practical; these features of intersubjectivity, 
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worldliness and praxis are all constitutive for the subject’s way 
of being. An important difference between these 
phenomenologists lies in the way this being embedded of the 
subject is actually thought. Sartre and Levinas, on the one 
hand, discuss the singularity of the human person in such a 
way that their view of the subject starts with a sharp 
separation between subjects. Merleau-Ponty, Patočka and 
Ricoeur, on the other hand, underline intersubjectivity as 
primary to any subjectivity and as an insurmountable pre-
reflective layer of existence. Furthermore, Patočka and Ricoeur 
stress, more than Merleau-Ponty, the responsibility of a subject 
for the other. A good understanding of human existence 
necessarily includes this notion of responsibility, in order to 
recognize human life as the life of an ethical subject (Jervolino 
2007). Let us take a closer look at this specific existential 
phenomenology, starting with the reflections of Jan Patočka. 
 
a) asubjective phenomenology 
More than his contemporary phenomenologists, Patočka 
stays close to the Husserlian phenomenological method of 
epochè and reduction. However, in Husserl’s phenomenology 
Patočka recognizes a problematic Cartesian tension, i.e. the 
effort to find absolute certainty in reflection, in the cogito. 
According to Patočka, the transcendental reduction does not 
lead to subjective or intersubjective consciousness as the “field 
of appearing”, but to a field that cannot be equated with a 
specific being that appears, to a field of appearing that is 
presupposed by all beings. In several texts, Patočka calls this 
field “world”, which means that all phenomena can only appear 
within a larger context, within a horizon (Patočka 1991, 2000). 
Worldliness is the main characteristic of every appearance. The 
world is not reducible to consciousness, as Husserl tried to show 
with his famous thought experiment (Husserl 1982, 109-112). 
To the contrary, consciousness can only understand itself as 
always already constituted in relation to the world, within the 
field of appearing. The world as the original horizon within 
which phenomena appear, organizes the subject as a centre 
around which they appear: 
 




But then, through the universality of the epochè, it also becomes 
clear that, precisely in the same way that the self is the condition of 
the possibility of the appearing of what is worldly, the world – as the 
original horizon [Urhorizont] (and not as the sum of realities 
[Realitätenall]) – presents the condition of the possibility of the 
appearing of the self. […] [The] I is only experienced as the 
organizational centre of a universal structure of appearance that 
cannot be reduced to a being as such, appearing in its particularity 
[Einzelsein]. (Patočka 2015a, 49)  
Through this elaboration of the transcendental epochè 
and reduction, Patočka develops an “asubjective 
phenomenology”, which he later labels as “phenomenology of 
the appearing as such”. “Asubjective” does not mean that the 
subject does not play any role in the manifestation of 
phenomena, but it does mean that the subject cannot find an 
unprejudiced transcendental position to describe the 
appearance of phenomena, for it is itself shaped by the field of 
appearing.  
Consequently, the subject can never entirely grasp itself. 
In his lecture course from 1969, Patočka describes the subject 
as a “primordial dynamism”, as a dynamic stream of centrifugal 
energy, always directed outward, towards the world (Patočka 
1998, 29-53). When the subject reflects on itself, it does not find 
this original dynamic I, but a “me”, that appears for the pre-
reflective I. In other words, the I is itself a horizon, that can 
never be surveyed: “The horizon is the appearance of what does 
not appear, appearing only in a certain sense and belonging to 
an appearance.” (Patočka 1998, 39)  
The main goal and orientation of this pre-reflective 
dynamism of the I is another I, is ‘Thou’. Only in relation to 
other subjects the I can realize its first reflection. As in a 
mirror, “…I see myself in the eyes of the other. The other need 
not be concretely instantiated. It is a constant structure of our 
experience; I see myself ever as the other, as the other sees me.” 
(Patočka 1998, 51) The subject, therefore, is originally 
embedded in worldly and intersubjective structures, that are 
primordial to any reflection (Mensch 2016, 3-63). These 
structures are not fixed; they are, just like the I itself, always in 
movement. In these phenomenological analyses of the dynamic 
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human existence, the subject is clearly de-centred, it is always 
being constituted by the world that it participates in.  
 
b) Movement and dedication 
Patočka’s reflections on movement belong to his most 
important contributions to phenomenology. He has written a 
profound study on the history of the concept of movement, with 
Aristotle as its main protagonist (Patočka 2011). According to 
Patočka, the Aristotelian notion of movement as purposeful 
actualisation of potentialities, needs to be taken up again in 
phenomenology. In modern philosophy the concept of movement 
was narrowed to a quantifiable pattern in an abstract space. 
Bergson has tried to develop a more insightful understanding of 
movement, as a synthetic unity of lived experience. Patočka 
tries to deepen this approach by combining Heidegger’s 
analyses of Dasein with the Aristotelian idea of movement as 
realisation of potentiality (Patočka 1998, 143-145). This also 
implies that Aristoteles’ view of movement, being related to a 
static kernel, needs to be radicalized: 
To understand the movement of human existence, for that we need to 
radicalize Aristotle’s conception of movement. The possibilities that 
ground movement have no pre-existing bearer, no necessary referent 
statically at their foundation, but rather all synthesis, all inner 
interconnection of movement takes place within it alone. All inner 
unification is accomplished by the movement itself. (Patočka 1998, 
146-147) 
Human existence is first of all a bodily existence. The 
body is a complex of movements that are interrelated and find 
their unity in themselves. These movements do not have a body 
as their substrate, they constitute the body in a constant flux of 
movements. In addition, the body-subject is not something in 
itself, it is always in dynamic relation with its environment, 
with the world. The world to which the subject relates, opens 
itself up in a spatial movement to the subject. The things in the 
world move towards the subject as a call, as an appeal of 
possibilities to be realised. “Our own dynamics, the verve that 
brings us to things, finds a counterpart in the orientation of the 
world towards us, in the original dynamic traits of space.” 
(Patočka 1995, 68)4 The movements in our body, the movements 




in connections with other people, the dynamic relations with 
the world make us who we are:  
Before we could be able to do whatever, the world has already 
obtained us, the world holds us, in and by our disposition. Such is the 
contribution of that domain to the original movement that we are – 
movement towards the world, from and through the world, back to 
ourselves. The disposition, ‘where one in is’, always already tells us 
in the most general way that we are in the world and where we are in 
it. (Patočka 1995, 69)5  
This circular movement between subject and world 
within the always comprising horizon of the world is 
constitutive for our human existence. We become ourselves by 
finding our place in the world. Patočka develops a deeper 
understanding of this dynamic intersubjective and social 
constitution of our existence by emphasizing the ethical side of 
it. Since human existence is always in movement and never 
fixed, it is a task and a responsibility. We have to take our life 
upon us, to realize it and to give an account of it. We can only 
find and understand ourselves, if we take the circular relation 
with the world, by which we exist as human beings, as a point 
of departure for our self-understanding. In other words, the 
relation between man and world is understood as a relation of 
surrender. In general terms, Patočka describes this surrender 
as a circular relation with the world that enriches our self: “The 
return to the self is not analogous to a reflection in a mirror; 
rather, it is a process in which we seek and constitute ourselves, 
lose ourselves, and find ourselves again.” (Patočka 1998, 57)6  
Patočka has further analysed this complex of circular 
relations between man and world in his idea of the three 
movements of human life. “Each of these three movements,” 
Patočka states, “is always a movement shared.” (Patočka 1998, 
149) The basic movements of human existence thus are all 
movements in which we are connected with the world and with 
other subjects. In several texts he has discussed this threefold 
movement in different contexts and with a different terminology.  
The first movement is described by Patočka as “the 
movement of sinking roots, of anchoring – an instinctive-
affective movement of our existence.” (Patočka 1998, 149) This 
concerns first of all our embodied existence: “…the original 
control over our own organism which is presupposed in all our 
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further, freer modes of comportment, of relating to humans and 
things.” (Patočka 1998, 148) It also consists in the way we 
always share our life with others. This is manifest “…in our 
dependence on an other who provides us with safety, with 
warmth, it is manifest in attachment, protection, sympathy.” 
(Patočka 1998, 149) All our relations to the world thus start 
from out of a natural and cultural belonging, which is obvious 
in the first years of our life, but which also remains a basic need 
during our entire life. Patočka calls this the mutual love and 
acceptance between parents and children, but also speaks about 
it as a mutual compensation for every individual existence. 
“This compensation takes place in all to whom this existence is 
devoted, whom it loves and whom it itself accepts in turn.” 
(Patočka 1996, 30; 1998, 149) Devotion and love are thus 
primordial aspects of human life. In short, “humans are beings 
for others.” (Patočka 1998, 177) This movement finds its 
boundaries in the earth as the unmoving ground on which it 
takes place, as well as in what is strange, unfamiliar and 
dangerous, the opposite of the safe and sound.  
The second movement is defined as “the movement of 
self-sustenance, of self-projection – the movement of our coming 
to terms with the reality we handle, a movement carried out in 
the region of work.” (Patočka 1998, 148) This is the realm of 
active relation to our environment, of the everyday use of 
things, which Heidegger called Zeug. Patočka calls it “the 
sphere in which we usually live, […] the sphere of meaning.” 
(Patočka 1998, 150) The intersubjective relations of work and 
cooperation find their reverse in concurrence, conflict and 
suffering. We can express ourselves in our work, but labour is 
also a burden. Nevertheless, Patočka describes this second 
movement also as a movement of self-denial, be it a self-denial 
in service of a self-interest through rational behaviour:  
The ideal of the second vital line is the ascetic ideal. Self-extension 
takes place in the context of self-denial, overcoming instinctual, 
immediate desire. Though ultimately it follows an instinctual goal, 
the means is self-control. (Patočka 1998, 159)  
The third movement is the one that makes our existence 
really human and authentic. Patočka describes it as “the 
movement of existence in the narrower sense of the word which 




typically seeks to bestow a global closure and meaning on the 
regions and rhythms of the first and second movement.” 
(Patočka 1998, 148) This means that humans are able to 
transcend the relations to things and to other humans in the 
world and to relate to the world as a whole, as well as to their 
own existence.  
There are several sides to this movement. It is a 
movement of truth in the sense that we can take a distance 
from the usual and traditional views on things and ask how 
they really are. By rational reflection, humans can put the 
knowledge and ideas of their seemingly self-evident 
perspectives between brackets and take a critical stand that 
asks for precise perception and argumentation.  
Nothing of the earlier life of acceptance remains in peace, al the 
pillars of the community, traditions, and myths, are equally shaken, 
as are all the answers that only preceded questions; the modest yet 
secure and soothing meaning, though not lost, is transformed. It 
becomes as enigmatic as all else. (Patočka 1996, 39-40)  
Questioning our traditional worldviews is part of this 
attitude; it asks for a rational understanding of the world. In 
this movement of transcendence, humans can find a meta-
perspective on the standards, procedures and perspectives by 
which they are connected with the world and with others. Such 
a meta-perspective, however, does not give survey over the 
whole world or one’s existence as a whole. It remains a 
perspective that is grounded in the first two movements of 
anchoring and self-projection.  
The finitude of this perspective implies an ethical side of 
the same movement. Since we cannot find definite answers to 
our questions about the essence of the world and of ourselves, 
we have to give an account of our views and judgments. The 
rationality of the third movement, its effort to find truth by 
reflection and argumentation, is thus directly connected with 
the ethical obligation to testify for our opinions. In other words, 
the third movement is the movement of responsibility. Only 
through this movement, the subject can understand itself as 
taking the position of openness towards the world and other 
beings: “…the world opens itself to it for the first time.” 
(Patočka 1996, 39) Humans are now able to understand 
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themselves in relation to the field of appearing, to being, they 
“…are called to things, to give them what they lack, to make 
that encounter possible. […] …human life is a service.” 
(Patočka 1998, 170)  
Moreover, only in this third movement the human being 
can understand itself as an ethical subject. Patočka calls it a 
movement of breakthrough, because it breaks through the 
boundaries of the first and the second movement, that were still 
tied to traditional patterns of thought and behaviour. The third 
movement reaches beyond our desire for safety and self-
development, beyond any self-interest. It is the highest 
movement of surrender, in which the individual human being 
gives up itself, loses itself and finds itself in a life of devotion to 
what is of higher importance than its own life. Patočka does not 
have in mind here a devotion to a higher entity, but a devotion 
toward the openness of being itself. The third movement is a 
movement of transcendence: “Not intentionality but 
transcendence is the original trait of life, […] the transcendence 
of humans towards the world, to the whole of what is brought to 
light.” (Patočka 1996, 48) This relation to the appearing as 
such, to the world as a whole, is not only and not primarily a 
matter of knowledge and thought, it is an ethical relation of 
praxis and freedom: “The transcendence to the world […] is 
originally not given by the activity of thought and reason; […] its 
foundation, rather, is freedom.” (Patočka 1996, 49) This ethical 
relation of surrender and devotion to being and to beings can 
also be described as a relation of love. (Patočka 2015b) 
In short, human life, in Patočka’s view, is an ethical life 
of self-surrender, in response to the call of other beings, an 
openness and devotion to other beings, beyond all self-interest 
(Mensch 2016, 92ff):  
My being is no longer defined as a being for me but rather as a being 
in self-surrender, a being which opens itself to being, which lives in 
order for things—as well as myself and others—to be, to show 
themselves as what they are. This means: life in self-surrender, life 
outside oneself, not a mere solidarity of interests but a total reversal 
of interest—I no longer live in that which separates and encloses, but 
rather in that which unites and opens, being openness itself. 
(Patočka unedited, 189)  
 





The third movement of human life, therefore, is what 
makes humans truly human. It is a breakthrough to a rational 
and ethical “life in truth”. Can we find here an affirmation of 
Ricoeur’s statement that both Patočka’s philosophy and his 
activities for Charta 77 might be placed in line with the 
tradition of modern European rationalism? On the one hand, 
yes, an understanding of the rational and ethical life of the 
human subject is in the heart of Patočka’s philosophy. On the 
other hand, Patočka regards his defence of the subject’s 
rationality and responsibility as radically different from this 
modern rationalist tradition. At the end of his lecture series, 
Patočka stresses this difference as one of the main conclusions 
of his course:  
Here phenomenology touched upon something that all modern 
humanism neglected, what that humanism lacks. Modern humanism 
thrives on the idea that humans are in some sense the heirs of the 
absolute […], that they have a license to subjugate all reality, to 
appropriate it and to exploit it with no obligation to give anything in 
return, constraining and disciplining ourselves. Here phenomenology 
touched upon the fundamental problem of humanism, that humans 
become truly human only in this non-indifference to being, when 
being presents itself to them and presents itself as something that is 
not real and so also is not human, something that challenges them 
and makes them human. (Patočka 1998, 178)  
In contrast to modern humanism, the human subject can 
only understand its own rational and ethical being, if it takes 
into consideration its de-centred position, if it surrenders itself 
to the world and to being, which are constituent to the subject 
in a way beyond the subject’s own understanding. Patočka has 
always elaborated on this view by making sharp contrasts with 
modern philosophy and modern culture, that located the subject 
in opposite to the world, in order to grasp and control it. 
Building on analyses by Husserl and Heidegger on the crisis of 
the modern sciences and on modern technological culture as 
Gestell, framing, Patočka vehemently criticises modernity 
(Patočka 1989c). In a text from the 1950s, he characterises 
modern culture as a “supercivilization”, a civilization that is 
radically and completely rationalised in all its domains, in such 
a way that everything becomes calculated, scheduled, 
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disciplined and manipulated (Patočka 1990c). All meaning has 
been reduced to calculable profit by “…a rationalism that wants 
to master things and is mastered by them.” (Patočka 1996, 110) 
In his Heretical Essays, Patočka describes how modern 
civilization has unchained gigantic technological forces that 
have no orientation and finally unleash their powers in violence 
and war. Thus, nihilism, decadency and war are the dark 
outcome of modern rationalism.  
A better understanding of human life can only be 
achieved through a radical break with this modern rationalism. 
A new breakthrough by the third movement of human existence 
is needed, a metanoia, that can uncover again the relation of 
man to the field of appearing, to being. From the viewpoint of 
modern instrumental rationality such a conversion can only be 
seen as an irrational movement, beyond calculation and self-
interest, as a sacrifice.  
In the sixth Heretical Essay, Patočka discusses this 
sacrifice as it comes to the fore in the front experience in the 
first World War, referring to testimonies of Ernst Jünger and 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. At the deepest low of modern 
European culture, this experience of absurd atrocities opens up 
the possibility of profound understanding of human existence 
and its relation to Being. In this context, Patočka takes up the 
Heraclitan notion of polemos, unity in conflict, as a 
characterisation of Being. Being needs to be understood as a 
unity, but this unity can never be described from one and the 
same point of view, there are always conflicting powers and 
perspectives. In the middle of a devastating war, therefore, one 
can find a testimony of the real polemos of human life: there 
can be no unity without inner conflicts. These conflicts 
undermine a full comprehension of being and of human 
existence as one totality in one theory or system. Genuine 
rational insight in human life, according to Patočka, is exactly a 
denial of modern rationalism that tries to grasp and dominate 
the whole of reality (Patočka 1998, 178; Dodd 2011; 2015; 
Hagedorn 2016). 
Nevertheless, in his defence of Charta 77 Patočka 
appeals to the modern notion of human rights, implicitly 
referring to Kant:  




The idea of human rights is nothing other than the conviction that 
even states, even society as a whole, are subject to the sovereignty of 
moral sentiment. […] …already a hundred and eighty years ago, 
precise conceptual analysis made it clear that all moral obligations 
are rooted in what we might call a person’s obligation to himself – 
which includes, among other things, the obligation to resist any 
injustice done him. (Patočka 1989d)  
Although he elsewhere refers to the pre-modern sources 
of human rights (Patočka 1990c), this appeal at least shows a 
tension in his evaluations of modern culture.   
 
2. Ricoeur 
Despite differences in style and in subjects of research, 
the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur shows many similarities with 
the thought of Patočka. Ricoeur’s early work, his 
phenomenology of the will, describes the tensions within the 
human subject of rational and irrational drives. The relation of 
consciousness to its own body shows its embeddedness in 
bodily, intersubjective and social structures, beyond its own 
influence and comprehension. Later, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of 
the subject consists of several works that culminate in his 
anthropological work Oneself as another, where he develops an 
ethical view on the subject and its personal identity. His 
approach of history and modernity, however, is very different 
from Patočka’s perspective. These three features will be 
discussed in this section. 
 
a) The Voluntary and the Involuntary 
One of the first studies of Paul Ricoeur on the human 
being as an ethical subject is his phenomenology of the will. He 
uses Husserl’s eidetic method, looking for a pure description of 
the will, but from the start he also recognizes that the first 
object of the will, one’s own body, that is supposed to act 
according to the will, can never be completely guided or grasped 
by it. A phenomenology of the will has to start with the subject 
as an “I will”, “je veux”, which is an intentional relation: “I will 
this or that”. The description of this intentional relation of 
consciousness in its practical functioning, is on all its levels 
confronted with the involuntary – with bodily needs and 
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desires, with emotions, habits, etc. – that does not entirely give 
in to the will, but remains a mystery. The human subject is not 
transparent. “The Cogito is broken up within itself.” (Ricoeur 
1966, 14)  
On the other hand, these involuntary aspects can only 
be recognized through the will. The voluntary and the 
involuntary, freedom and nature, consciousness and its object, 
are therefore always already intertwined:  
[…] the initial situation revealed by description is the reciprocity of 
the involuntary and the voluntary. Need, emotion, habit, etc., acquire 
a complete significance only in relation to a will which they solicit, 
dispose, and generally affect, and which in turn determines their 
significance, that is, determines them by its choice, moves them by 
its effort, and adopts them by its consent. The involuntary has no 
meaning of its own. Only the relation of the voluntary and the 
involuntary is intelligible. (Ricoeur 1966, 4f.) 
This reciprocity is described by Ricoeur on many levels 
throughout the book. He discerns three main phases of willed 
action: decision, actual movement and consent: “To say ‘I will’ 
means first ‘I decide”, secondly ‘I move my body’, thirdly ‘I 
consent’.” (Ricoeur 1966, 6) All these phases are described on 
three levels: Ricoeur starts with a general “pure eidetic 
description”, which is followed by descriptions of the lived 
bodily experience of performing and implementation, and 
finally by an analysis of the several steps of this enactment. 
Ricoeur starts his phenomenological analysis of the 
decision with an eidetic description: “a decision signifies, that 
is, designates in general, a future action which depends on me 
and which is within my power.” (ibid., 43) Already with regard 
to pure reflection, he recognises a profound reciprocity within 
the subject. It is me who decides, as the French reflexive 
pronominal form of the verb indicates: “je me décide”. The fact 
that I relate my actions and my decisions to myself, 
presupposes a pre-reflective self-consciousness in which the self 
relates to itself. In willing and deciding I discover myself as my 
own possibility. In the temporal mode of the decision, its 
relation to the future, I find myself dispersed in time. In 
addition, my will, as it is part of a project, has to connect to the 
possibilities it finds in the world. These possibilities make the 
projected action possible, but also determine its limits:  




The possibility of my action is determined by the entire actual order 
of events which presents my action with a point of application, that 
is, by a collection of prohibitions and opportunities, obstacles, and 
feasible routes. That is the world of the voluntary agent – a complex 
collection of resistances and opportunities, of walls and of ways. 
(Ricoeur 1966, 53)  
In a way that is comparable with Patočka’s asubjective 
phenomenology, although in perhaps a bit less radical manner, 
Ricoeur locates the human will and action in the world, as 
always already embedded in situations and horizons:  
[…] the first possibility inaugurated by the will is not my own can-be 
but the contingent possibility that I open in the world by projecting 
acting in it; it is the can “be done” intended on the world, this world 
that always remains on the horizon of my choice like the field of 
operation of my freedom. (Ricoeur 2016, 56) 
The will is not an arbitrary urge, it has its reasons and 
motivations. Here, again, activity and receptivity go together. 
Values and motivations are instances that move us to act. I 
encounter these values and reasons in my decisions, they form 
the course through which I decide and by which I legitimise my 
actions (Ricoeur 1966, 66-84).  
Ricoeur finds the same ambiguity in the relation to our 
bodies. First of all, the existence as such of the body precedes 
my will, is involuntary. “The ‘I am’ or ‘I exist’ infinitely 
overwhelms the ‘I think’.” (ibid., 85) Our conscious will is 
embodied, is embedded in the body and cannot but act through 
it. On the one and, I live my body from within and “traverse” it 
in my actions, on the other hand the body has its own vital 
values and needs. These vital tendencies are much more 
complex than the usual distinction between pleasure and pain. 
At the root of choice, they introduce an ambiguity that leads to 
hesitation as a profound feature of decision (ibid., 110f.; Boyer 
2010). Hesitation, attention and choice constitute the decision 
in a temporal process that is not completely transparent and 
that cannot be grasped in a pure eidetic reflection.  
Ricoeur’s analysis of the decision thus consists of three 
stages: a pure eidetic description, an account of the body with 
its largely involuntary needs and motivations, and an 
examination of the temporal performing of the decision; the 
latter two stages manifest the limits of the eidetic description. 
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The same threefold structure can be found in the other two 
phases of wilful action in The Voluntary and the Involuntary: 
action and consent. Ricoeur starts the second phase with an 
eidetic analysis of intentional acts and movements. Then the 
spontaneous bodily constitution of the action by irretrievable 
emotions and habits is discussed, followed by an analysis of 
how our muscular efforts and our emotions and habits take 
place at the limit of our understanding of them. Through all 
these actions, our voluntary movements adjust to the powers 
that make them possible (Ricoeur 1966, 199-337).  
In the third phase, which Ricoeur calls consent, the 
tendency of reflection to be total and transparent and to be its 
own source, is countered again by the involuntary. He starts 
with a pure description of consent, which is followed by the 
“experienced necessity” that shows itself in the first person 
singular, in my character, my unconscious and even my life. 
The way of consent, then, leads through an acceptance of its 
own finitude that can never be completely grasped rationally 
and gives rise to poetic expressions of this consent, in the myths 
of Stoicism and Orphism. Other myths are discussed in his 
later book La symbolique du mal.  
These myths are answers to the limits of our rational 
self-understanding. Human freedom can only be understood 
well by means of limit-ideas, like Kant’s regulative idea, in 
which the unity of human existence is thought, through the 
experience of a dramatic duality. These limit-ideas take 
together in reciprocity the activity and receptivity of will and 
action, its consent and necessity, in short, the voluntary and 
the involuntary:  
We need to recover a similar function for regulative ideas in relation 
to the originary phenomenological field. I will say therefore that 
there is a “human” signification, a signification of human unity, 
which is the idea of a motivated, incarnate, contingent freedom. […] 
We have no access to this signification of the human as one except 
through the deciphering of the relations between the voluntary and 
the involuntary. It is therefore solely an intentional unity toward 
which the experience of a dramatic duality points. […] Against this 
background, this horizon of unity, I live out the dramatic duality of 
being human. (Ricoeur 2016, 71) 




In his early work, therefore, in a very different style, 
Ricoeur’s phenomenological analyses of human freedom and 
will manifest an understanding of human existence which is 
remarkably similar to Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology. 
Rational and ethical human life can only be understood against 
the background of fundamental structures of world and 
intersubjectivity (cf. Colin 1991).  
 
b) Oneself as Another 
Ricoeur’s view on man as a rational and ethical agent is 
further developed in several works and reaches its summit in 
Oneself as Another. This is a rich and complicated study of the 
human being as an ethical person. The question “who is the 
human person?” is analysed and discussed on several levels: 
“Who is speaking? Who is acting? Who is recounting about 
himself or herself? Who is the moral subject of imputation?” 
(Ricoeur 1992, 16) Human self-understanding is thus examined 
on the level of language, action, narrative and morality. In the 
same manner as he did in The Voluntary and the Involuntary, 
Ricoeur steers a middle course between the modern self-
positing cogito and its deposition: “the hermeneutics of the self 
is placed at an equal distance from the apology of the cogito and 
from its overthrow.” (Ricoeur 1992, 4) Human self-
understanding cannot do without the “I think”, but its rational 
reflection is already embedded in and relates itself to layers of 
its existence that are not transparent. In his typical style, 
Ricoeur describes these tensions as dialectical relations 
between poles that presuppose each other, but cannot be 
reduced to each other.  
Several dialectics are thus grafted on each other: firstly 
the relation of the I to itself in such a way that it never 
coincides with the self; secondly, the relation between sameness 
and selfhood; thirdly the relation between self and other:  
To say self is not to say I. The I is posited – or is deposed. The self is 
implied reflexively in the operations, the analysis of which precedes 
the return toward this self. Upon this dialectic of analysis and 
reflection is grafted that of idem and ipse. Finally, the dialectic of the 
same and the other crowns the first two dialectics. (Ricoeur 1992, 18) 
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In his discussion of human identity from the perspective 
of language and action, Ricoeur has encountered several 
aporias that all have to do with the temporality of human 
existence. The human person is dispersed in time, without 
having a clear objective kernel that remains the same. Only 
narrative theory can deal with these aporias in a convincing 
way. It is through stories that we understand and identify 
ourselves. It is through narrative only that the temporal 
permanence of human existence can be understood. Theoretical 
approaches of personal identity have always been looking at an 
objective what: What is the human person? What am I? 
Narratives can answer the question: Who am I? 
Ricoeur distinguishes two sorts of permanence in time: 
idem and ipse, sameness and selfhood. Sameness is what 
allegedly remains the same, selfhood is the active self-
maintenance that cannot be objectively defined. In his 
description of sameness, Ricoeur takes up again his notion of 
character, which he also used in The Voluntary and the 
Involuntary (Ricoeur 1992, 119-120) and describes it here as: 
“Character […] designates the set of lasting dispositions by 
which a person is recognized.” (Ricoeur 1992, 121) In his new 
analysis in Oneself as Another, character appears less 
immutable than in the previous works. A human personal 
character is actually changing and in development, but it 
manifests itself as durable and lasting, as if it does not change 
at all. It is the sedimentation of a personal self-realisation (ipse) 
that appears as if it has always remained the same:  
[…] character is able to constitute the limit point where the 
problematic of ipse becomes indiscernible from that of idem, and 
where one is inclined not to distinguish them from one another. […] 
… precisely as second nature, my character is me, myself, ipse; but 
this ipse announces itself as idem. (Ricoeur 1992, 121) 
In other words, the identity of character is an expression 
of the adherence of the what to the who: “Character is truly the 
‘what’ of the ‘who’.” (Ricoeur 1992, 122) Bodily dispositions, 
talents and capacities go together with circumstantial 
opportunities, upbringing and choices, in such a way that they 
lead to sustainable personal traits, a second nature.  




Selfhood is the constant development of the self in 
relation to character. Ricoeur describes it as a self-maintenance 
[maintien de soi] by keeping one’s word, keeping promises. Self-
identity is not a given, it is a task that has to be accomplished. 
It does not make sense, therefore, to try to express personal 
identity in terms of “what”. The question of personal identity 
can only be articulated in terms of “who”: who am I? The 
answer to this question needs to be given in a story, a 
narrative, that also functions as an ethical account of oneself. 
Personal identity is developed in the plot and intrigue of a 
historical narrative, that, on the one hand, finds a coherence of 
actions and experiences, and, on the other hand, is open for new 
events and for moments of discontinuity. A narrative, as 
Ricoeur puts it in Time and Narrative, is a “concordance 
discordante.” (cf. Ricoeur 1990, vol. I, 42-45, resp. 64-70) In 
narration, self-identification remains a dynamic process, in 
which the dialectics between idem and ipse, between sameness 
and selfhood, can develop. Through narratives, selfhood has to 
cope with the alleged given of character. Personal identity thus 
needs to be acquired at several levels: practices, life plans and 
life as a whole.  
With regard to a comparison with Patočka’s notion of the 
third movement, in which it is stated that human existence as a 
whole cannot be surveyed, we might ask whether, in Ricoeur’s 
approach, a narrative can give an overview of life in its totality. 
Ricoeur recognizes several problems in this regard. Both 
historical and fictive stories have a beginning and an end, 
whereas we do not have experiences of the beginning and 
ending of our own life. In addition, we can tell different stories 
with varying plots about different life plans (our career, our 
family, our hobbies, etc). Can these stories be taken together in 
the emplotment of one encompassing life narrative? Ricoeur 
criticizes Alasdair MacIntyre for too easily accepting the unity 
of life in a biography. For Ricoeur it remains an open question, 
whether several life stories can be united in one biography 
(Ricoeur 1992, 175-180). The unity of one’s personal identity is 
an infinite ethical task that can never be completely fulfilled 
(Rasmussen 1996).  
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In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur introduces narrative as a 
way to combine descriptions of human behaviour by theories of 
action with a moral perspective. Storytelling appears as the 
bridge between description and prescription. It extends the field 
of praxis and can serve at the same time as a “laboratory for 
moral judgment.” (Ricoeur 1992, 140) In addition, our life story 
is told to others, as an ethical justification. In sort, self-
maintenance by keeping one’s word, being accountable for 
others, is the kernel of our ethical selfhood. With a reference to 
Levinas, Ricoeur describes self-reference as an ethical response 
to the other: “…the idea of a response to the question ‘Where 
are you?’ asked by another who needs me. This response is the 
following: ‘Here I am’ [me voici], a response that is a statement 
of self-constancy.” (Ricoeur 1992, 165) Therefore, our narrative 
identity may be fragile, it is indispensable for our ethical 
responsibility. In this opposition Ricoeur sees a fruitful tension 
that needs to be understood in a dialectical manner (Waldenfels 
1996). 
Ricoeur makes a distinction between ethics and 
morality. Ethics refers to the orientation of the good life; 
morality to the implementation of this orientation in norms 
that pretend to be universal and imply the use of force. An 
Aristotelian teleological perspective is thus combined with a 
Kantian deontological perspective. Again, Ricoeur takes two 
approaches together in a dialectical style. There is a primacy of 
ethics over morality; the ethical orientation needs to pass the 
sieve of morality; and morality needs to be legitimized by 
ethics. Parallel to this distinction, Ricoeur divides the ethical 
self-understanding in self-esteem and self-respect. There is a 
primacy of self-esteem over self-respect; self-esteem receives the 
form of self-respect under a moral regime; if morality is 
confronted with aporias, self-respect serves as source and help 
for self-respect. (Ricoeur 1992, 170-171) 
The ethical orientation is further divided in three 
relations: to the self, to the other and to many others, or, in 
Ricoeur’s own terms: in “…a view of the ‘good life’, with and for 
the other, in just institutions.” (Ricoeur 1992, 172) A thorough 
discussion of Ricoeur’s ethics, as it is developed in the 7th, 8th 
and 9th study of Soi-même comme un autre, exceeds by far the 




limits of this article. As the triple distinction cited above 
already indicates, he tries to combine an Aristotelian, Kantian 
and Hegelian approach of ethics, in such a way that the many 
paradoxes and aporias can be made fruitful in dialectical 
analyses. A Kantian autonomy is preserved within the 
Sittlichkeit of institutional contexts, in such a way that it is 
“…entrusted to the practical wisdom of moral judgment in 
situation.” (Ricoeur 1992, 274; Carter 2014) 
Ricoeur’s discussion of all these aspects of ethical 
selfhood culminates in the notion of attestation, the testimony 
we can give of ourselves, that needs to be trustworthy. The 
certainty I and others can have of myself, is a matter of trust. 
Reliability to the other, to whom I must be able to give an 
attestation, an account of myself, is the kernel of my self-
understanding (Ricoeur 1991c; 2013; Greisch 1996).  
So far, we can see many similarities in the philosophies of Patočka 
and Ricoeur. Human life is primordially embedded in natural and 
social horizons. What makes this life human, is the ethical call 
within these horizons and the rational manner of responding to 
them. Ricoeur was well aware of his proximity to Patočka. In a 
lecture he gave in Naples in 1997, he explicitly discusses these 
elements of Patočka’s thought and their connection. He recognizes an 
elliptic and reciprocal relation between, on the one hand, Patočka’s 
elaborations on the notion of the “natural” world in his a-subjective 
phenomenology, and, on the other hand, his reflections in the 
Heretical Essays on the meaning of history, that originates in a 
mythical pre-historical world. These two sides of Patočka’s 
philosophy are related by presupposing a “fundamental pre-scientific 
and pre-historical anteriority”, i.e. they are always already embedded 
in a natural and cultural world. (Ricoeur 2007, 193-217) 
 
c) modernity 
Critique of modernity as such, as it can be found in the 
work of Patočka, is not a theme for Ricoeur. He develops his 
thought in line with traditions of modernity, without feeling the 
need to recover ideas that were lost in modern philosophy and 
in modern culture. Patočka discusses modern culture as a 
supercivilization in such a way that he not only describes its 
inner conflict – between its radical and moderate forms – but 
denounces the whole principle per se of complete domination of 
reality. Such a radical opposition to modernity cannot be found 
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in Ricoeur’s philosophy. To the contrary, in his introduction to 
the Heretical Essays, Ricoeur utters his concerns about 
Patočka’s profound and radical criticism of modern culture: 
“…the strange, frankly shocking passages about the dominance 
of war, of darkness and the demonic at the very heart of the 
most rational projects of the promotion of peace…” (Ricoeur 
1996, viii).  
Ricoeur does discern inner conflicts in modern 
civilization, but only in order to make them fruitful in a 
dialectical fashion. To give an example, in the course of 
modernity, rationalism was first established and then tends to 
undermine itself by rational self-critique. This inner tension is 
taken by Ricoeur as a point of departure in Oneself as Another. 
He is looking for a dialectical route in between the cogito as 
posited by Descartes and the cogito shattered by Nietzsche. 
Furthermore, the ethical part of Oneself as Another is for a 
large part an elaboration on the tension between Kantian 
morality and Hegelian ethical Sittlichkeit. The whole discussion 
of personal identity, therefore, takes place in the framework of 
modern philosophy. In another example, the same goes for his 
work on recognition, in which Ricoeur in large measure 
elaborates on Hegel (Ricoeur 2005). 
With regard to Ricoeur’s views on communist 
totalitarianism – one of the main features of what Patočka calls 
supercivilization –  a gradual change can be discerned. Ricoeur 
has always been in favour of socialist economic reforms, while 
at the same time defending individual human rights. He was 
very well aware of the profound problems of totalitarian 
communist states, like the Soviet Union and China, but he 
refused to take sides in a too simple antagonism between these 
totalitarian states and the so-called “free world”. In his earlier 
works he pleads for internal reforms in the communist societies 
(Ricoeur 1955; 1991b). This attitude shifts, when it appeared to 
be impossible to alter these regimes from the inside into a 
“socialism with a human face”. The violent suppression of the 
Prague Spring and the tragic death of Patočka, due to the 
regime’s response to Charta 77, have certainly played a role in 
this change of thought. One can see a testimony of this 




influence in the quotations from Ricoeur’s commemoration of 
Patočka at the beginning of this article (Michel 2008). 
Another target of Patočka’s critique of supercivilization 
is modern technology. Again, this is not an issue that Ricoeur 
has reflected upon extensively, but neither is it absent in his 
work. In various articles, he recognizes the well-known tension 
between instrumental reason and ethical values, and mentions 
the urge to avoid a technocracy by democratic means. However, 
he always approaches these problems of modern technology as 
questions that need to be answered within the confines of 
modern culture (Kaplan 2003; 2011; Lewin 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
The comparison in this article has manifested that the 
work of Patočka and Ricoeur, despite huge differences in style 
and topics of research, contains a profound consensus in the 
understanding of the human being as a rational ethical person. 
Both philosophers regard humans as insurmountably 
embedded in natural, cultural, and intersubjective structures. 
By rational reflection we can and need to attain insight in this 
embedding, but this insight is finite. Therefore, we shall never 
be able to completely grasp all facets of our lives. This is, 
however, no reason to endorse irrationalism or scepticism. The 
finitude of our reflection is exactly the main reason to look for a 
rational understanding of our existence. Since our choices and 
our way of life are not self-evident, we need to reflect on them 
in order to give an ethical account of ourselves. Furthermore, 
reflection can show us how our being embedded in social and 
intersubjective structures implies ethical relations as 
constitutive for our existence. Patočka and Ricoeur have 
conceptualized this characterization of human life as, 
respectively, devotion and attestation. In devotion and 
attestation, humans can understand themselves as rational 
ethical persons. 
The main difference of Patočka and Ricoeur lies in their 
evaluation of modernity. Whereas Ricoeur elaborates on major 
tensions and aporias in modern philosophy and culture, 
Patočka calls for a thorough reconsideration of modern rational 
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culture as a whole. His appeal to human rights, however, 
reveals a tension in his critique of modernity.  
In conclusion, Ricoeur’s claim that Patočka’s view on the 
human being as a rational ethical subject is representative for 
modern European rationalism, can at least be seen as 
paradoxical. On the one hand, many aspects of Patočka’s 
anthropological reflections and analyses, e.g. his view on 
human freedom and rationality, can easily be traced 
historically to developments in modern philosophy. On the 
other hand, he has explicitly and profoundly criticized main 
elements of modern civilization, especially its rationalism. 
Nevertheless, each in their own way, Ricoeur and Patočka have 
offered major contributions to our understanding of humans as 
rational ethical subjects, by revealing the essential role of 






1 Author’s translation from the French original; cf.: “Je n’hésite pas à discerner 
dans cet appel de Husserl un des relais par lesquels la présente revendication des 
libertés et des droits humains, à Prague, se rattache au grand rationalisme 
européen de l’âge classique, par-delà les socialismes du XIXe siècle.” 
2 “Il est difficile pour les intellectuels occidentaux, encore tout occupés à se 
déprendre du moralisme et à déconstruire la raison, de comprendre ce recours 
des intellectuels tchèques à la morale dans le champ même de la revendication 
politique.”  
3 “[…] le plaidoyer philosophique pour la subjectivité devient, dans le cas de 
l’extrême abaissement d’un people, le seul recours du citoyen contre le tyran.”  
4 Author’s translation from the French edition: “Notre dynamique propre, l‘élan 
qui nous porte vers les choses, trouve un pendant dans l’orientation du monde 
vers nous, dans les traits dynamiques originaires de l’espace…” 
5 Author’s translation from the French edition: “Avant que nous ne soyons en 
état de faire quoi que ce soit, le monde s’est déjà emparé de nous, le monde nous 
tient, dans et par notre disposition. Telle est la contribution de ce domaine au 
mouvement originaire que nous sommes – mouvement vers le monde, puis, à 
travers le monde, de retour à nous-mêmes. La disposition, « ou l’on en est », 
nous dit toujours déjà de la manière la plus générale que nous sommes au monde 
et oú en lui nous sommes.” 
6 It is at this point that Patočka’s existential phenomenology takes a turn that is 
different from Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of embodiment and 
intersubjectivity (cf. Evink 2013).  
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